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The Implementation of ECOWAS' New Protocol and Security




In October 1999, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1270
concerning the armed conflict in Sierra Leone shortly before the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a new
protocol in November 1999. The implementation of this Resolution by the
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), first, side by side,
and later, in conjunction with the ECOWAS Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) proved to be a telling moment in the history of joint
peacekeeping operations between the United Nations and regional
organizations. Three key ECOMOG contingents-Nigeria, Ghana, and
Guinea-withdrew from Sierra Leone as a result of a deepening crisis
between the leaderships of ECOWAS, dominated by Nigerians, and
UNAMSIL, substantially composed of Indians. A later effort by the U.N.
to fashion a cohesive mission under a unified command only brought
more woes. The leadership of UNAMSIL under Major-General Vijay
Jetley collapsed, leading to the withdrawal of the 3,000 strong Indian
contingent from Sierra Leone. The purpose of this article is to examine
Resolution 1270 and the new ECOWAS protocol, analyze the
relationship between UNAMSIL and ECOWAS, and then consider the
impact of ECO WAS' new protocol on the law ofpeacekeeping.
Introduction
The years 1990-2000 constituted a moment of truth for the
hitherto little known sub regional organization, the Economic
Community of West African States (hereinafter ECOWAS).1 From being
*(LLB) Lagos, (LLM) Cantab, PhD Candidate and Teaching Assistant in international law,
University of Nottingham. This article is a sequel to my commentary on the new ECOWAS
protocol, The New Collective Security Mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations and Problems, 5(2) J.
CONFLICT & SECURITY L., 211-229 (2000). Most of the ECOWAS materials referred to in this
article are on file with the author. They were obtained directly from ECOWAS headquarters in
Abuja, Nigeria in 2000 while the author interned With the legal department. The writer also attended
one of the many summits of ECOWAS heads of States and governments during this period, and
conducted several interviews with the Directors and the Deputy Directors of the Department of
Legal Affairs of ECOWAS. Except when referring to such interviews specifically, this article does
not represent the view of the ECOWAS legal department. Lastly, I am indebted to Professor Nigel
White and Dr Paolo Galizzi for their comments on an early draft of this article. However, all
mistakes are entirely mine.
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an economic community at its inception in 1975, ECOWAS literally
reinvented its will in August 1990 to become, not only a collective
security organization, but also a pacesetter in the development of
regional collective security systems ingrained in the Chapter VIII of the
United Nations Charter.2
In 1993, ECOWAS became the first regional alliance to
undertake a joint 'peacekeeping' operation with the UN in the entire
history of collective security. 3 It matched this record in 1997 when it
forcefully restored a democratically elected government in Sierra Leone,
becoming the first regional organization to reinstate an overthrown
government in Africa. It could be said that the alliance closed a decade of
momentous events in its evolutionary history in December 1999 when it
adopted a new protocol (hereinafter Protocol), which not only codified
the controversial rights of humanitarian intervention and the use of force
to restore democratic governments, but also empowered it to undertake
enforcement action without the authorization of the Security Council.
4
The concurrent application of the Protocol to the Sierra Leone
conflict as the U.N. was implementing the mandate contained in its
Security Council Resolution 1270 was fraught with telling legal and
practical consequences. To wit, certain provisions of the Protocol depart
from the decentralized enforcement regime of Chapter VIII of the U.N.
Charter, which empowers regional arrangements to undertake
enforcement action only with the authorization of the Security Council.
Furthermore, the position of certain rules, widely believed to have
1 ECOWAS was formed on May 28, 1975, by the Treaty of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and was amended in 1993. The Member States of ECOWAS are: The
Republics of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, the (Islamic Republic of) Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
and Togo. 35 I.L.M. 660 (1996).
2 On August 7, 1990, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee on the Liberia conflict
established the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Banjul, Republic of Gambia. See
United Nations, Security Council, Letter Dated 9 August 1990 From The Permanent Representative
Of Nigeria To The United Nations Addressed To The Secretary- General, U.N. Doc. S/21485 (1990)
(annex); REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, 6
CAMBRIDGE INT'L L. SERIES VI. 67 (Marc Weller ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994) [hereinafter M.
Weller]
3 Resolution 866 expressly states that this "would be the first peace-keeping mission undertaken by
the United Nations in cooperation with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another
organization, in this case ECOWAS." U.N. SCOR, 3281st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES.866 (1993).
4 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peacekeeping and Security, 5 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 231 (2000)
5 U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. 1.
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evolved into the corpus of the law of peacekeeping over time, would
appear to have become greatly undermined.6
For purpose of this article, the intervention by ECOWAS in
Sierra Leone is broadly divided into two phases. The first phase is
designated as beginning with the overthrow of the democratic
government of Tejan Kabbah and concluding with the restoration of that
government by ECOMOG forces, and the eventual withdrawal of certain
ECOMOG contingents from Sierra Leone. This article shall not be
concerned with the legal analysis of this phase except insofar as
references to it are necessary. The second phase of the intervention-the
main focal point of this effort-commences with the deployment of U.N.
peacekeepers under the aegis of UNAMSIL and the re-entry of the
Nigerian contingent into Sierra Leone. The need to make this thematic
delineation at the outset is informed by the fact that at least one legal
commentary on the first phase of the intervention already exists.
7
Moreover, the activities of ECOWAS under the first phase of its
intervention in Sierra Leone were conducted under the auspices of its old
legal regime, as represented by its Protocol on Non-Aggression' and the
Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense (PMAD).9 Although the
specific decisions of ECOWAS concerning its actions on the Sierra
Leone conflict are contained in the numerous Final Communiqu6s issued
at the end of its myriad summits on the matter, ECOWAS substantively
complied with the provisions of the U.N. Charter and performed
obligations imposed on it by the Charter during this phase.' ° It follows
that a legal analysis of the first phase of ECOWAS' intervention under
its old regime and in accordance with the U.N. Charter was in order."
6 Although there is no direct provision of the U.N. Charter on the law of peacekeeping, it is believed
by commentators that certain features of peacekeeping operations such as consent, impartiality,
limited force, and so on, have evolved into the customary law ofpeacekeeping.
7 See generally Karsten Nowrot and Emily Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy:
International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT'l L.
REV. 321 (1998).
8 Report of the Secretary-General on the Question of Liberia, U.N. Doe. S/25402, at 6 (1993). The
Protocol on Non-Aggression was adopted on April 22, 1978. See M. WEllER, supra note 2, at 18.
9 Report of the Secretary- General on the Question of Liberia, supra note 8, at 6. The Protocol on
Mutual Assistance and Defence was adopted on May 29, 1981. See also 3 OFFICIAL J. EcoWAS 9
(1981); M. WELLER, supra note 2, at 19.
10 As early as July 10 1997, ECOWAS had reported to the U.N. its decision to impose sanctions on
the rebel forces in Siena Leone. Sierra Leone News Archives, (July 10, 1997), available at
http://www.sien-a-leone.org/slnews0797.html [hereinafter slnews].
11 Nowrot's and Schabacker's analysis was very comprehensive on the first phase insofar as this
analysis was an inquiry into the legality of ECOWAS' use of force to restore a democratic
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By contrast, ECOWAS conducts the second phase of its
intervention under a totally different legal regime, which, as will be
discussed below, does not conform to the provisions of, or perform the
obligations imposed by, the Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter.12 The
application of this new legal instrument demonstrably engenders
different legal consideration, and since there has not been an inquiry into
this matter, to the best of this writer's knowledge, it is appropriate to
focus more specifically on that issue.
The remaining part of this article is divided into two parts. In the
first part, I briefly recount the background to the armed conflict in Sierra
Leone. I will then examine the implementation of the mandate issued to
the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone by Resolution 1270, and
analyze the various factors that led to the breakdown in the relationship
between UNAMSIL and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, ECOMOG.
In the second part, the article examines the effect of the Protocol on the
'law' of peacekeeping. Particular attention shall be devoted to the
following issues: (1) whether the Protocol abrogated the 'customary'
requirement of consent, and (2) whether the Protocol has caused member
states to permanently cede their right to reject or terminate an
intervention proposed by ECOWAS.
I. PART ONE
A Brief Background to the Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone 13
The armed conflict that has engulfed Sierra Leone for nearly four
years, with its accompanying brutality, was ignited on May 25, 1997,
when a group of the country's armed forces toppled the democratically
elected government of Alhaji Tejan Kabbah in a military coup d'dtat.14
The election of Tejan Kabbah brought to an end the 19 year one party
stronghold of Joseph Momoh after a brief military regime led by Captain
Valentine Strasser, who himself was ousted in yet another coup by his
deputy, Julius Maada Bio.1 It then fell to the latter head of junta to
transfer the reins of government in Sierra Leone to a democratically
government, a casu foederis that was neither included in its old legal regime or expressly permitted
by the U.N. Charter.
12 See Ademola Abass, supra note 4.
13 For a legal-historical explanation of Sierra Leone from the 15th century to the period before the
conflict, see the article that follows.-Eds.
14 James Rupert, Civilian Rule Overturned in Sierra Leone: Soldiers Seize Power, Loot W. African
Capital, WASH. POST, May 26, 1997, at A21. See the condemnation of the coup by the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Andrew Meldrum, Annan and OAU Leaders Endorse
Intervention against "'Usurpers", GUARDIAN (London), June 3, 1997, at 14.
15 Key Events in Sierra Leone's Conflict, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/africa
/sierra-leone-chrono.html [hereinafter Key Events].
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elected government led by Kabbah.16 Upon his overthrow, President
Kabbah had fled to the neighboring Guinea from where he allegedly
invited ECOWAS to help reinstate him to the governance of Sierra
Leone. 17
On May 28, the leader of the military junta, Major Paul
Koromah abolished the constitution of Sierra Leone and installed the
Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC).1 Following a massive military
campaign inaugurated by the Nigerians-albeit ostensibly operating
under the auspices of ECOWAS-the ECOWAS Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG), in a ground-breaking episode of regional peacekeeping in
Africa, reinstated the deposed Tejan Kabbah to the governance of Sierra
Leone on March 10, 1998.19
The defeat of the coupists at this time, however, soon turned out
to be a temporary affair. The rebels loyal to Fodah Sankoh, the leader of
the rebel group known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), acting
in conjunction with the surviving 'mutineers,' 20 launched fresh attacks
against government positions. The RUF had mounted a guerrilla war
against successive military and civilian governments of Sierra Leone on
the ground that both connived with foreign countries to "milk the
country's diamond riches and impoverish its people. 21
ECOMOG troops had been stationed in Sierra Leone, under a
Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) since the days of the Liberian crisis
with the purpose of preventing a spillage of that crisis into Sierra Leone
and to curb trans-border infiltration from Liberia into Sierra Leone.22
During its twentieth session held at Abuja, Nigeria, on August 28-29,
16 See http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/missions/unomsil (last visited Oct. 27, 2001)
17 Id. However, in reality, ECOWAS had already perfected plans to intervene in the crisis even
before the supposed invitation came from the exiled president. The so-called invitation did not
emanate from Kabbah until the ECOWAS summit August 27-28, 1997, (slnews, supra note 7)
whereas ECOWAS had concluded deliberation on the actions to be taken a month earlier. Meeting of
the ECOWAS Committee of Four on Sierra Leone, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, July 17-18, 1997
(unpublished material, on file with author).
18 Id.
19 U.N. SCOR, 3861st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES. 1156 (1998).
20 Although the events of May 25, 1997 constituted a coup d'dtat, President Tejan Kabbah had called it
a mutiny. In one of his addresses to the nation shortly after his overthrow, he instructed the members of
the Sierra Leone Army in similar terms; As your commander I hereby order you to report to the nearest
ECOMOG base without arms in your possession and declare your loyalty. By doing so you will avoid
being treated as a mutineer. See slnews, supra note 13.
21 Key Events, supra note 14.
22 Final Communique, Meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff of Contributing States of ECOMOG in Sierra
Leone, Abuja, (April 15, 1999), para. 9(a) (on file with author).
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. VOL. 10
1997,23 the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS,
having convinced itself of the need to extend the scope of activity of
ECOMOG to Sierra Leone and to modify its mandate, approved a new
mandate for ECOMOG.24 Under the new mandate, Nigeria sent 700
troops to Sierra Leone, bringing the total number of that country's troops
in Freetown, the Sierra Leone capital city, to 1,600.
From 1997 onward, ECOWAS, which had officially affirmed
that "it is the only Force in the Sub-region capable of prompt response to
any requests in this regard [intervention] ' '2' became largely responsible
for seeking a resolution of the Sierra Leone crisis. In May 2000, Nigeria,
which has been, by far, the largest provider of both human and material
resources for ECOWAS missions in the sub-region, withdrew from
Sierra Leone.26 The rebels capitalized on what the Security Council
described as "a dangerous vacuum" created by the exit of the Nigerians
to unleash on the civilian populace of Sierra Leone, an outrageous orgy
of violence the proportions of which were widely reported to surpass any
violence in history.27 It was these circumstances that compelled the U.N.
to deploy its peacekeepers to Sierra Leone, in order to implement the
various resolutions its Security Council had adopted concerning the
conflict, and also to supervise the implementation of the Lom6 Peace
Accord already agreed to by the conflicting parties.28
B. Legal analysis of Resolution 12 70
1. The UNAMSIL Mandate in Sierra Leone
23Final Communiqu of the Summit of the Economic Community of West African States, held at Abuja
on 28 and 29 August 1997, U.N. Doc. S/1 997.695 (1997) [hereinafter Decision].
24 Id. at Art. 1.
25 Decision A/DEC.7/8/97 (1997) (on file with author).
26 BBC NEWS, Nigeria Sets Intervention Terms, (May 10, 2000), available at http://news.bbe.co.
uk/hi/english/world/africa. Not only did Nigeria provide the largest contingent to Sierra Leone, it
actually undertook to pay the salaries of the Sierra Leone contingent in ECOMOG when the Sierra
Leone government failed to pay its troops beginning in September 1996.
27 Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in
Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/1998.960, at 2-5 (1998), noting in parts that the rebel attacks were
"accompanied by a resurgence of atrocities of the nature and scale last observed during the period
from April to June, including the complete destruction of villages, and the torture, mutilation and
execution of large numbers of civilians."
28 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front
of Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/1999.777 (1999). This Accord recalled two earlier Peace initiatives,
the Abidjan Peace Agreement of November 30, 1996 and the ECOWAS Peace Plan, October 23
1997, at http://www.Sierraleone.org/lomeaccord.html.
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The first official response by the U.N. to the Sierra Leone
conflict came in the form of Resolution 1132,29 which had, at first,
prohibited the sale and supply of arms and related materials to Sierra
Leone as a whole. 30 The coverage of this resolution was later reduced by
Resolution 1171 so that its operation targeted only the non-governmental
forces.31 Notably, Resolution 1132 was adopted both under Chapter VII
and Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter. Acting under the latter, the
resolution specifically authorized ECOWAS to ensure "strict
implementation of the provisions of this resolution relating to the supply
of petroleum and petroleum products, and arms and related materiel of
all types, including, where necessary and in conformity with applicable
international standards, by halting inward maritime shipping in order to
,132inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations....
This directive of the U.N. would seem to be superficial in light
of the fact that the resolution was in response to ECOWAS' request that
the U.N. mandate all its members to respect the sanctions ECOWAS had
already imposed on the junta.33 However, with media reports and rumors
mounting that certain member states of ECOWAS were aiding the
'mutineers', such a directive was quite necessary if the expected results
were to be achieved.34
Shortly after this embargo, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1181 which established the United Nations Observer Mission
29 U.N. SCOR, 3822d mtg., S/RES.1132 (1997).
30 Id. at2.
31 U.N. SCOR, 3889th mtg., para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES. 1171 (1998).
32 Id. at 3, para. 8. This resolution is analogous to Resolution 676 concerning the crisis in former
Yugoslavia. However, whereas the latter had been silent on the specific organisations invited to act
by the U.N., Resolution 1132 had mentioned ECOWAS specifically. It would appear that 1132
intended that ECOWAS could undertake enforcement action to achieve the stated objective.
However, such an interpretation is difficult to arrive at without taking a closer look at the wording of
the resolution. It avoided the usual euphemistic phrase 'to use all necessary means', but instead,
expressly determined the kind of action ECOWAS might take: interdiction of ships. One query that
arises is whether ECOWAS was authorized to use force to achieve this objective where a ship did
not concur with its directives.
33 Art. 2 of Decision, supra note 23, at 5, stating that "Member States shall place immediately a
general and total embargo on all supplies of petroleum products, arms and military equipment to
Sierra Leone and abstain from transacting any business with that country."
34 Although Cote d'Ivoire and Libya were prominently featured in the media reports as violating the
sanction regime, the ECOWAS Ministerial Committee of Five on Sierra Leone noted that "certain
individuals were contravening the embargo." See Communiqud, Fifth Meeting of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, Abuja, October 10-11, 1997 (on file with
author).
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in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL).35 The Resolution mandated UNOMSIL to,
inter alia, "monitor the military and security situation in the country as a
whole...", "...and to monitor the disarmament and demobilization of
,,36fuciformer combatants.' It was to function for an initial period of six
months until January 13, 199917 but had its mandate severally extended
in the following months.38
Resolution 1181 is analogous to Resolution 866 concerning the
Liberian conflict.39 Resolution 866 established the United Nations
Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) which was mandated to perform
functions virtually similar to those entrusted upon UNOMSIL. Both
resolutions were adopted after ECOWAS had been acting in the
concerned countries. Resolution 1181 also welcomed the commitment of
ECOMOG to protect UNOMSIL personnel just as the U.N. had
requested ECOMOG to protect UNOMIL personnel in Liberia.
Therefore, the relationship between ECOWAS and the U.N. under
Resolution 1181 was that of co-operation with ECOWAS providing
military coverage for the U.N.
Following a series of violations of the terms of the ceasefire
established under the Lom& Peace Accord by the RUF, which led to fresh
hostilities between the government and RUF rebels, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1270. This resolution affirmed that the situation in
Sierra Leone constituted a threat to international peace and security in
the region, in accordance with Article 39 of the U.N. Charter.4° This
resolution then established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL). 41 UNAMSIL was given the mandate to "co-operate with
the government of Sierra Leone and other parties to the Peace Agreement
in the implementation of the Agreement [and] to assist in the
implementation of disarmament, monitor adherence to the ceasefire [and]
to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance" among other things.42
The initial mandate of UNAMSIL was for six months.43 The resolution
35 U.N. SCOR, 3902d mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES. 1181 (1999).
36 Id. at 2, para. 6.
37 Id.
38 U.N. SCOR, 3986th mtg., para 1., U.N. Doc. S/RES.1231 (1999); U.N. SCOR, 4012d mtg., para.
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES.1245 (1999).
39 Resolution 866, supra note 3, at 2.
40 U.N. SCOR, 4054th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES.1270 (1999). The first determination by the Security
Council that the situation in Sierra Leone constituted a threat to international peace and security in
the region was made in Resolution 1132; supra note 29.
41 Resolution 1270, supra note 39, at para. 8.
42 Id. at para. 8 (a),(b),(e),and (g) respectively.
43 Id. at para. 8.
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urges co-operation and co-ordination between ECOMOG and
UNAMSIL.44
Like many previous resolutions on the Sierra Leone crisis,
Resolution 1270 was adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
However, Resolution 1270 expressly approves a new mandate for
ECOMOG, which had been formulated by ECOWAS and had not been
adopted under any U.N. provision. 4' Furthermore, Resolution 1270 states
that in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may take necessary
action to ensure the security and freedom of its personnel and, within its
capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians
under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the
responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG.46
Insofar as Resolution 1270 was adopted under Chapter VII, it
presupposes that UNAMSIL mandate would be an enforcement
operation. This assertion is enhanced by a literal construction of the
wording of the mandate of that Resolution, which enjoins the
peacekeepers, not only to take necessary action to ensure the security and
freedom of its personnel, but also to afford protection to civilians under
imminent threat of physical violence. Unlike 1132 authorizing ECOWAS
action against ships, actions under 1270 clearly targeted rebel forces who
might act in any manner as to prevent UNAMSIL soldiers from
performing the task assigned to them by their mandate, or endanger their
safety.
Analytically, the wording of Resolution 1270, in the manner
stated above, is fraught with many ambiguities. In practice, the U.N.
rarely explicitly authorizes its peacekeepers to use force. Instead, it
subsumes such authorizations under liberal phrases as "all necessary
means." 47 Often, the U.N. encourages states co-operating with a troubled
state to render "all assistance necessary" to mitigate particular problem.
Nevertheless, these types of phrases are commonly construed by states
and commentators as indeed empowering U.N. troops to use force
beyond the threshold of self-defense.48
44 Id. at para. 12.
45 Decision Redefining The Mandate of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, U.N. Doe. S/1999.1073 (1999)
[hereinafter Decision 1999].
46 Resolution 1270, id. note 39, at 3, para. 14 (emphasis added).
47 See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES.678 (1990), which authorises Member
States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait.. .to use "all necessary means" to uphold and
implement resolution 660.
48 U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/PV.2963 (1990). In this Security Council debate leading to
the adoption of Resolution 678, the Council members variously expressed their understanding of the
phrase. Mr. Al- Ashtal, representing Yemen, argued that the statement is "in effect authorizing States
to use force", Mr. Qian Qichen of China was of the opinion that the phrase, "in essence, permits the
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Nevertheless, such mandates are usually contained in resolutions
adopted within the framework of two types of operations. The first is
where a U.N. operation is conceived as an enforcement action ab initio,
as was Resolution 678 concerning the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The
second is where an original peacekeeping operation is being transformed
into an enforcement action, as was the case with Resolution 794
concerning Somalia. 49 The formula for signaling a change in the mandate
of a peacekeeping mission is mostly by adopting a resolution that almost
invariably empowers peacekeepers to take necessary actions for safe
delivery of humanitarian assistance or relief50 Where a U.N. mission is
conceived originally as a peacekeeping operation, and remains
essentially so despite the changing circumstances of the conflict, the
U.N. will not normally, as a matter of practice, imbue pure peacekeeping
missions with such ambivalent mandates.
Issuing a peacekeeping mission with enforcement mandates,
without a corresponding transformation of the operation into an
enforcement action, would appear to be what the U.N. did with
Resolution 1270. In providing, as it were, that UNAMSIL may, within its
capabilities and areas of deployment, afford protection to civilians,
UNAMSIL appears to have a mandate that is much wider in scope than a
usual peacekeeping one, but still short of express authorization of an
enforcement action. By contrast, during the Congo crisis, Security
Council Resolution 169 had strengthened ONUC's mandate in order to
maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of the
Republic of Congo.
Although Resolution 169, like Resolution 794, did not expressly
indicate that the U.N. mission was undergoing a metamorphosis, its real
use of military action." Mr. Abu Hassan of Malaysia noted the "force authorized by the Council."
Mr. Hurd of the U.K. also noted that according to the resolution, Member States "are authorized to
use force as may be necessary to compel compliance." The United States representative was even
more explicit: "[t]oday's resolution is very clear. The words authorize the use of force." See also
John Quigley, The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New Order or
Disorder? 25 CORNELL INT'L L. J., 1 (1992).
49 U.N. SCOR, 3145th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES.794 (1992). The Security Council adopted this
resolution after the failure of Security Council Resolution 732 of 1992 to make any significant
impact on the warring factions. Resolution 794 authorised the U.S. to lead a mission using "all
necessary means." It must be noted that whereas UNOSOM I had been an Observer Mission, with a
mandate to monitor a ceasefire brokered between the factions, hence a peacekeeping operation, the
U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF) established pursuant to Resolution 794 was construed as an
enforcement action. See also H. MCCOUBREY & J MORRIS, REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST
COLD WAR ERA, 130 (The Hague: Kluver Int'l. L.) (2000).
50 Resolution 794, supra note 48. The mandate was to use "all necessary means to secure
humanitarian relief."
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import was not lost on anyone. Derek Bowett observed that although
Resolution 169 did not amount to outright enforcement action, it
authorized a robust peacekeeping-a hybrid position between classical
peacekeeping and enforcement action. s' Nigel White argued, perhaps
more persuasively, that "it would be best to summarize ONUC's actions
having as their constitutional base the enforcement of provisional
measures under Article 40, but since these measures were increasingly
widely drawn so as to cope with an ever-deteriorating crisis, they
amounted to de facto enforcement action.
5 2
Thus, when Resolution 1270 read, in part, that the peacekeepers
should facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance, the impression is
created that the operation, though conceived originally as a peacekeeping
one, would, in reality, be implemented in an enforcement mode. This
indeed was ECOWAS' assumption upon the adoption of Resolution
1270.
Notwithstanding the ambiguous nature of Resolution 1270 as
revised by 1289,"3 it is clear from the explicit utterances of member
states of the U.N. that the mandate was intended to be a peacekeeping
one. During the Security Council's emergency meeting to discuss the
situation in Sierra Leone,5 4 the Secretary-General reminded the Council
that, "our mission was configured as a peacekeeping force. It was neither
designed nor equipped to be an enforcement operation.""5 He added "it
was attacked by one of the parties that pledged to cooperate with it,
before it had been properly deployed. Given that situation, we have to
consolidate and reinforce our troops so that they can defend themselves
and their mandates effectively." Notably, the Secretary-General's
statement had fallen short of requesting an authorization of enforcement
action for UNAMSIL.
The reactions of the states taking part in the meeting, to the
request by African states for a revision of the UNAMSIL mandate
referred to by the Secretary-General in his speech, is instructive on how
the mandate should be construed. The Algerian delegate to the
emergency meeting, Mr. Bali, impressed on the Council that "this test of
UNAMSIL shows very clearly that the mandate and resources available
to it are not and never were adequate to the situation.,1 6 The delegate of
the United Kingdom, Mr. Eldon, however, cautioned against
51 D. W. BOWETT, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY, 180 (Stevens, 1964).
52 HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, THE BLUE HELMETS: LEGAL REGULATIONS OF UN
OPERATIONS, 53 (Dartmouth: 1996).
53 U.N. SCOR, 4099th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES.1289 (2000).
54 U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4139th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4139 (2000).
55 Id. at 2-3.
56 Id. at 5. The 'test' referred to here is the capture of 500 UNAMSIL personnel by the RUF forces.
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transforming UNAMSIL mandate into enforcement one. He noted that
"for the moment, UNAMSIL's mandate is sufficient for it to carry out its
tasks," and suggested that the U.N. Security Council should "be wary of
adopting an over-hasty approach," a veiled reference to Algeria's
position. 7
The position of the United Kingdom found strong support from
the Americans. Mr. Cunningham, representing the United States,
observed that United Nations peacekeepers "were organized and sent to
Sierra Leone not to impose a settlement, not to enforce the peace, but to
assist in the implementation of the Lom6 Agreement., 58 Russia followed
this line when it argued that "the mandate given UNAMSIL in Security
Council Resolution 1289 (2000) allows sufficiently strong measures to
be taken to ensure the safety of international personnel in the country and
of the Government of Sierra Leone."5 9
An official explanation of the ambiguous nature of the mandate
contained in Resolution 1270 as amended, and the raison d'6tre
underlining states' support for this mandate at the relevant time, came
from the delegates of Malaysia and Bangladesh to that meeting. In his
opinion, Mr. Hasmy contended that Malaysia supported the "limited
Chapter VII mandate then because there was an agreement on the table
and because the cooperation of the parties was assured to be
forthcoming. Clearly, many of us have been proven wrong and we will
have to recalibrate our response appropriately., 60 Mr. Chowdhury,
representing Bangladesh agreed with Malaysia, affirming that "we
placed our trust in Lom6, believing that it would work, and acted
accordingly in mandating the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL). With recent developments in Sierra Leone, we have to take
a fresh look at the peace structure and the peacekeeping mandate we had
approved.,
61
From the foregoing statements, it is clear that, although there
was disagreement at the meeting on whether or not to revise UNAMSIL
mandate to enable it meet the changing circumstances in Sierra Leone,
all participants agreed that the mandate was a peacekeeping one. No state
argued that the mandate justified an inference of authorization of
enforcement action by the Security Council. Hence, it is contended here
that notwithstanding the wording of the mandate and the adoption of
Resolution 1270 under Chapter VII, UNAMSIL mission was a
peacekeeping operation, with limited power to use force under specified
circumstances.
57 Id. at 6-8.
58 Id. at 11.
59 Id. at 16.
60 Id. at 11. The Agreement refened to by My Hasmy is the Lom6 Peace Accord, supra note 27.
61 Id. at 12.
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It is instructive to note that Resolution 1289, which revised the
UNAMSIL mandate, removed from it any words that might give rise to
an inference of authorization of enforcement action. It solely authorized
UNAMSIL to "facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian
assistance along specified thoroughfares., 62 The wording of this
provision is remarkably different from that in Resolution 1270. In the
latter, the UNAMSIL mandate had included the use of necessary means
to "facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. 63 This phrase, it is
contended, is much broader than the one contained in Resolution 1289 in
that it does not define the limit beyond which UNAMSIL may not render
humanitarian assistance. The effect of this alteration is that, under
Resolution 1289, UNAMSIL has no authority to deliver humanitarian
assistance beyond the specified thoroughfares.
Undoubtedly, the ambiguous nature of UNAMSIL's mandate
adversely affected its implementation. It is not clear what circumstances
would qualify as threats of physical violence. 4 Nor is the phrase
responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG free
from ambiguities. Although there was some co-operation between
ECOMOG, which had at all times been implementing enforcement
action, and protecting U.N. personnel with same, and UNOMIL troops at
this stage, Resolution 1270 clearly envisaged a different mandate and
command regime for UNAMSIL. Thus, there was a greater need for the
Security Council to elaborate what the responsibilities of ECOMOG
would be under this Resolution.
Unlike analogous resolutions adopted by the Security Council
with respect to conflicts occurring elsewhere, in which the U.N. has had
to act in conjunction with other international organizations, 6 Resolution
1270 does not provide for joint command of troops. Therefore, upon
deployment of UNAMSIL troops to Sierra Leone, the troops had to
operate alongside the ECOMOG troops but under a separate command
regime. Resolutions 128966 and 1299,67 which revised and increased
UNAMSIL's mandate respectively, and Resolution 13 17,6 which
62 Resolution 1289, supra note 52, at 3, para. 10(b).
63 Supra note 39.
64 Eleven British paratroopers were taken hostage by a Sierra Leone rebel faction, the "West Side
Boys," between late August and early September, an occurrence that typifies an instance that could
have fallen under this provision had the Resolution already been adopted.
65 See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 401 lth mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES. 1244 (1999). Resolution 1244 provides
for joint command between the Kosovo Forces (KFOR) and NATO, which the Resolution expressly
requests in order to substantially participate in the mission.
66 Resolution 1289, supra note 53.
67 U.N. SCOR, 4145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES.1299 (2000).
68 U.N. SCOR, 4193d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES.1317 (2000).
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extended its terms, did not touch upon this crucial aspect of 'joint'
military operation involving two different international organizations.
2. Need Resolution 1270 be more precise?
There exist several reasons for it to be expected that the U.N.
would spell out, as clear as possible, the rules of engagement and the
nature of the relationship of its mission with that of ECOWAS. Up until
the adoption of Resolution 1270, there were little or no practical
problems between ECOMOG troops and their U.N. counterparts, at least
in terms of command and control of their respective missions. The
reasons for this calm relationship between the two organizations are not
far fetched.
In the first phase of its intervention in Sierra Leone, ECOWAS
acted under its two Protocols-the Protocol on Non-Aggression and the
Protocol on Mutual Defense and Assistance-and was constantly
informing the U.N. of its activities under Article 54 of the U.N.
Charter. 69 It enjoyed absolute discretion over the command of its troops
and exerted total control over political decisions governing their
activities. It assumed its own mandate, as it deemed fit in the
circumstances, and superintended virtually all of the peace accords with
conflicting parties. On the other hand, UNOMSIL was only an observer
mission. It had no peacekeeping roles to perform, except, like UNOMIL
did in Liberia, to monitor the implementation of the disarmament
agreement and the overall military and security situation in Sierra Leone.
In fact, the respective roles to be performed by ECOMOG and
UNOMSIL were formally set out in a letter from the President of Sierra
Leone to the Security Council 70 which somehow complemented the
details of the relationship between the two missions in Resolution 1181.
In fact, UNOMSIL was to be protected by ECOMOG troops.7'
The above scenario was, to say the obvious, superficially
conducive for a 'co-operation' to be assumed between the two
organizations. In reality, however, the two organizations had little or
nothing to actually co-operate about as far as their mandates were
concerned. At this stage of their missions, the two organizations were
performing widely divergent tasks that could not possibly collide.
ECOWAS was mainly preoccupied with seeking ways to completely
route out the rebels from Sierra Leone's political landscape and
consolidate the reinstated Tejan Kabbah on the governance of the
69 The Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, U.N. Doe.
S/1998.249 (1998). See also slnews, supra note 10.
70 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, U.N. Doc. S/1 998.741 (1998).
71 Art. 1 of Decision C/AHSG/DEC.1/8/99 Redefining the Mandate of ECOMOG in SielTa Leone
(on file with author).
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country, by means and measures it decided on with unlimited freedom.
7 2
UNOMSIL, on the other hand, was only monitoring the military and
security situation in Sierra Leone with no real concern, whatsoever with
the fate of the rebels, or indeed, the safety of the democratic government
of Tej an Kabbah.73
Towards the end of 1999 however, the relationship between
UNOMSIL and ECOMOG turned sour on account of two immediate
factors. The first was the introduction of UNAMSIL into the political
equation of the Sierra Leone crisis, equipped with a "peacekeeping"
mandate. 4 It must be pointed out that before the adoption of Resolution
1270, the U.N. entirely endorsed the main objective of ECOWAS, the
reinstatement of the Kabbah government7 , and heartily welcomed "the
return of that government" to Sierra Leone, notwithstanding that it was
restored by the use of unauthorized force by ECOMOG.76
Naturally, ECOWAS had expected that the new resolution would
complement the enforcement mandate ECOMOG forces were already
implementing.77 The second reason was the adoption by ECOWAS
member states of a new protocol for the regulation of its interventions
within two months of adopting Resolution 1270. 7' This protocol, it must
be emphasized, empowers ECOWAS to undertake enforcement action
without seeking the authorization of the Security Council.79
In these circumstances, tension soon began to grow between the
two sides. On December 21, 2000, the Nigerian President, Olusegun
Obasanjo, informed the U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, that
Nigeria could not accept two peacekeeping forces in the same country,
and that Nigeria would withdraw from the ECOMOG force by the end of
February.8 ° The Ghanaian and Guinean contingents also gave similar
72 For the objectives of ECOWAS in Sierra Leone, see the Declaration of the Committee of Four on
the Situation in Sierra Leone, Abidjan, 29-30 July 1997 (on file with author).
73 This role would however be assumed later by UNAMSIL. See the Russian's statement during the
4139th meeting of the Security Council, supra note 53, at 16.
74 (emphasis added).
75 Final Communiqu6, Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers ofECOWAS, Conakry 26 June 1997
(on file with author).
76 Resolution 1156, supra note 18.
77 The ECOWAS Director of Legal Affairs, Mr. Roger Laloupo, disclosed this fact to the author
during an interview in March 2000. The author had asked specifically what led to the discord
between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL forces. Interview with Roger Laloupo, Director of Legal
Affairs, ECOWAS, in Abuja, Nig., (Mar. 2000).
78 The Protocol on collective security was adopted in furtherance of Article 58 of the Revised
Treaty, supra note 1.
79 See discussion infra.
80 See generally http://www.sierra-leone.org/slnewsOlOO.html.
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indications. 81 President Obasanjo's position, it must be pointed out, was
complementary to the hostility already going on between the UNAMSIL
and ECOMOG commanders. Thus, it seems appropriate to submit that it
was the introduction of UNAMSIL, without a detailed demarcation of
responsibilities between it and ECOMOG troops despite their divergent
mandates, and the adoption of a new legal framework by ECOWAS, that
undermined the supposed cooperative relationship between the U.N. and
ECOWAS in Sierra Leone.
The failure of the U.N. to take these developments on board at
the implementation stage of Resolution 1270's mandate led to serious
consequences, such as the virtual erosion of U.N. command and control
in Sierra Leone, leading to the withdrawal of the Indian contingent from
UNAMSIL. The Nigerian, Ghanaian and Guinean ECOMOG contingent
also withdrew from Sierra Leone, a situation that prompted the U.N. to
increase UNAMSIL from 6,000 to 11,000 troops.
The next issue to examine is the practical effect of ECOWAS'
new protocol on the implementation of Resolution 1270. The focus here
shall be on the adoption of a peacekeeping mandate by UNAMSIL and
the lack of clarity as to the command regime between UNAMSIL and
ECOMOG forces. An outline of relevant provisions of the new protocol
is included, but before embarking on a detailed examination of them, it is
worthwhile to say a few words about the circumstances in which
ECOWAS agreed to return to Sierra Leone. It is the combined effects of
these occurrences that set the stage for the events that led to the collapse
of the UNAMSIL command.
C. ECOWAS' New Protocol: A Brief Outline of its Objectives
The legal regime upon which ECOWAS premised the first phase
of its intervention in Sierra Leone consisted of the provisions of the
Protocol on Non-Aggression12 and the Protocol on the Mutual Defense
and Assistance (PMAD)83 as well as the principles of general
international law governing peacekeeping. The adoption of the Protocol
Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security [hereinafter Protocol] by
ECOWAS member states on December 10, 1999,84 provided a catalyst to
81 Resolution 1289, supra note 52, at 2, para. 7, "takes note of the decision of the Governments of
Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana to withdraw their remaining ECOMOG contingents from Sierra Leone,
as reported in the letter to the Secretary-general of 23 December 1999."
82 Adopted on April 22 1978; See Report of the Secretary-General on the Question ofLiberia, U.N.
Doc. S/25402, at 6 (1993); See also M. Weller, supra note 2, at 18.
83 Adopted May 29, 1981. See also M. Weller, supra note 2, at 19-20.
84 The Protocol was adopted at Lom, Togo, on December 10, 1999. Although it is yet to be
ratified, it entered into force provisionally (Article 57 (1)) upon signature by all Heads of State and
2001-2002 SIERRA LEONE: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERVENTION 193
the ensuing discord between the ECOMOG troops and their UNAMSIL
counterparts. The Protocol not only recast the role of ECOWAS in the
collective security of its hemisphere, it indeed controverted the very
foundation upon which the initial co-operation between UNOMSIL and
ECOMOG had been based: the legal framework of Chapter VIII of the
U.N. Charter. 5
To be sure, Article 10(c) of the Protocol empowers ECOWAS to
dispense with the Security Council authorization as sine qua non to its
enforcement actions in West African conflicts.8 6 In addition, Article 34
contains comprehensive provisions that will enable ECOWAS to retain
the command of its troops and the control of political decisions affecting
their operation in the field of deployment.87
It must be emphasized at this juncture that ECOWAS had
manifested unequivocally, right from the days of its intervention in
Liberia, a predilection for being in charge of its troops in terms of
command and control.88 The fact that an outright conflict did not arise
between the ECOMOG forces and those of the United Nations Observer
Mission in Liberia, UNOMIL, owes more to the docile nature of the task
the latter had to perform than it being a manifestation of cordiality
between the two groups. 89
With Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS quest for an unquestionable
authority over the command of its troops and the political control of
decisions concerning implementation of their mandate became ever more
pronounced. At the meeting of chiefs of defense staff of contributing
States to ECOMOG, held in Abuja, Nigeria, on April 15, 1999,90 the
organization "reiterated that the general [c]ommand and [c]ontrol of the
Governments of ECOWAS. The author obtained a copy from ECOWAS Headquarters in Nigeria
while on an internship between March 25 and April 5, 2000. See also 5 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY
LAW 231 (2000). For a commentary on the Protocol, see Ademola Abass, supra note 4.
85 In a personal interview with the Director of Legal Affairs, the author was informed that it would
not be in the best interest of ECOWAS to wait for the authorisation of the Security Council at the
outbreak of violence in West Africa. Interview with Roger Laloupo, Director of Legal Affairs,
ECOWAS, in Abuja, Nig. (Mar. 28, 2000).
86 This Article empowers the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) to, inter alia, "authorise all
forms of intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political and military missions."
5 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 231, 237 (2000).
87 Id. at 248.
88 First Session of the Community Standing Mediation Committee, Banjul, 1990, Article 11 (2) (on
file with author).
89 For an analysis of the joint action in Liberia, see Funmi Olonisakin, UN Co-operation with
Regional Organisations in Peacekeeping: The Experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia, 3
INT'L PEACEKEEPING 33 (1996).
90 Final Communiqug (on file with author).
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participating troops are vested on the Force Commander [sic]." Thus, it
is contended that Article 10, outlining the enormous powers the new
Mediation and Security Council possesses, especially subsection (2)(c),
which empowers it to authorize all forms of actions, and Article 34,
which sets out the chain of command, culminated from ECOWAS
practice since it launched its intervention in the Liberian conflicts.
In effect, through its Protocol, ECOWAS signaled a radical
departure, not only from the legal regime under which its first experience
of intervention was perfected, but also from the classical relationship that
existed between its own collective security regime and that of the U.N. In
regards to the latter, ECOWAS did deliberately decide to do away with
the provisions of Article 53(1) of the U.N. Charter mandating regional
arrangements to first seek the authorization of the Security Council
before embarking on an enforcement action. In response to the concern
raised by Professor Margaret Vogt, one of the resource persons consulted
when drafting the Protocol, about the potential impact of Article 10(2)(c)
on Article 53(1) of the U.N. Charter, the ECOWAS Director of Legal
Affairs responded that:
The meeting [of experts] considered these observations made by
Prof. Vogt and was of the view that whilst the sub region
appreciates the importance of its obligations under the United
Nations Charter, its recent experience has shown that the cost of
waiting for the United Nations authorization Could be very high in
terms of life and resources. 9'
Noteworthy in the above quoted statement is that, right from the
conception of its new legal regime, ECOWAS had decided not to
contingent its legal ability to intervene in conflicts occurring within the
region to a prior authorization by the Security Council. Indeed, in the
meeting preceding its return to Sierra Leone, as discussed below,
ECOWAS made this new position quite obvious.
1. ECO WAS' Conditions for Participating in Sierra Leone (Phase Two)
Shortly after the deployment of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, the
rebel movement in Sierra Leone captured 500 hundred U.N. personnel.92
This development impelled the U.N. to request the re-entry of the
Nigerian contingent-which, in substance, means ECOWAS-into the
Sierra Leone crisis.93 At a meeting held in Abuja, the capital city of
Nigeria, ECOWAS accepted the U.N. invitation, but then laid down three
vital conditions that would govern its action if it were to return to Sierra
Leone.94
91 Passage taken from Ademola Abass, supra note 4, at 223-4.
92 U.N. Doc. S/PV.4139, supra note 53, at 9.
93 Id. at 5.
94 http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/news2/nn785902.htm (last visited May 22, 2000).
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Under its first condition, the alliance presented to the U.N. three
different modalities for participating in any operation directed toward the
resolution of the conflict. 95 The first of these was for ECOWAS to
contribute its own troops as part of the UNAMSIL soldiers.96 Under this
arrangement, soldiers of the ECOWAS monitoring group, ECOMOG,
would operate under the United Nations command. As for the second
alternative, ECOMOG would operate under the Lom6 Peace Accord as
partners with the U.N. However, the alliance did not specify what the
arrangement would be as per the regime of command and control of
forces under this option. Nevertheless, since the situation under the
second option would have obliged the two organizations to work side by
side as they did before ECOWAS withdrew from Sierra Leone, it is to be
assumed that each organization would have retained the command of its
troops. As to the last option, ECOMOG troops would completely
supplant the U.N., forcing the U.N. to revert to the observer role it played
during the operation in Liberia, or during the UNOMSIL period in Sierra
Leone.97
Irrespective of which of these three options ECOWAS might
elect, the organization stated explicitly through its Director of
Information, Dr. Adrienne Diop, that "the West African component
under ECOMOG in Sierra Leone will have its own command."98 It
follows from this assertion that, whatever might emerge from the three
options proposed by ECOWAS, it will not, in the final analysis, affect
the fundamental question of who commands and controls ECOMOG
forces that might be deployed. ECOWAS indeed made good on the threat
not to subjugate its troops to the U.N. command when, following a rift
between its commander and its U.N. counterpart, ECOMOG forces
obstinately refused to take orders from the latter.
The second condition laid down by ECOWAS at the Abuja
meeting was that no matter what relationship might exist between
ECOWAS and U.N. troops, ECOWAS would implement its own
mandate.99 This, it declared in advance, would be enforcement action
95 The Security Council recognised these modalities during its 4139th meeting, supra note 53, at 11;
See also BBC NEWS, Nigeria Sets Intervention Terms (May 10, 2000), at http://www.
bbc.co.uk/hienglish/world/africa/newsid_743000/743219.stm.
96 http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/news2/nn785902.html (last visited May 22, 2000).
97See Madu Onuorah, Segun Ayeoyenikan and Tunji Oketunbi, ECOWAS to Deploy 3,000 Troops
to Sierra Leone, http://www.ngrguardiannews.com.
98 Id.
99 Id. In fact, the Vice-President of Nigeria, Atiku Abubakar, expressed the view, with respect to the
first phase of the ECOWAS mission that "the command ought to have gone to Nigeria, because
Nigeria - having been in Sierra Leone for quite some time, and quite familiar with the terrain - would
have made a better job of it." See generally http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/ world/africa.
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contrary to a peacekeeping mandate UNAMSIL was already
implementing.1 °° The third and final condition given by ECOWAS was
that the U.N. would meet all expenses incurred by the organization in the
course of discharging its mandate. 10 1
Several aspects of these conditions merit consideration.
However, we shall only focus our attention on two vital issues: first, the
proposal by ECOWAS to retain the command of troops; second, the
proposal to implement the enforcement mandate as against the U.N.
peacekeeping alternative. Two factors would appear to have motivated
these conditions. Firstly, ECOWAS was clearly unwilling to return to a
conflict where it would not be in charge of its own troops. The events
leading to its withdrawal during the first phase of its mission apparently
informed the decision to set this matter straight well in advance of its
return to Sierra Leone. Secondly, ECOWAS had adopted a new protocol,
following the withdrawal of its key contingents from Sierra Leone, and
was ready to commence the regulation of its collective security activities
in West Africa, in accordance with its own law.
102
Obviously, it is strategically more rewarding for ECOWAS to
return to Sierra Leone under its own legal regime which not only frees up
its actions from the Security Council authorization but also relieves it of
the obligation to report such activities under Article 54 of the Charter.
Article 52(3) of its Protocol only obligates ECOWAS to "inform the
United Nations of any military intervention undertaken in pursuit of the
objectives of this Mechanism."' 13 As this writer has partly argued
elsewhere, the insertion of the phrases 'military intervention' and
'undertaken' in this article, as against the requirement of Article 54 of
the U.N. Charter that regional arrangements report actions "undertaken"
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 In a private interview with the ECOWAS Director of Legal Affairs in April 2000, the Director
confirmed to the author that the real motivation behind the Protocol was the need to free ECOWAS
from the many restrictions of the U.N. Charter. He explained that while the Charter has imposed
many obligations on regional organisations, it has not imposed similar obligations on the U.N. to
intervene in crises. He cited the tragedy in Rwanda as an example in which the U.N. Security
Council had not been willing to do much. Thus, he put a question to the author: 'Should the
circumstances of Rwanda erupt in an ECOWAS State in the future and the U.N. adopt the approach
it did in Rwanda, what do you think ECOWAS should do'?. Interview with Roger Laloupo, Director
of Legal Affairs, ECOWAS, in Abuja, Nig. (Apr. 2000); For an official version of ECOWAS'
justification for designing a treaty that dispenses with the U.N. authorisation, see also Meeting of
Experts on the Draft Protocol Relating to the Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management,
Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security, 17-19 Nov. 1999, Lone, Togo, at 6 (on file with author).
103 See Ademola Abass, supra note 4, at 220.
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or in "contemplation," provides a leeway for ECOWAS to circumvent
this obligation in two ways.
It is contended that the rationale for Article 54 of the U.N.
Charter requiring regional arrangements to report not only actions
already "undertaken" but also those in "contemplation" is to enable the
Security Council to exercise some control on the measures a regional
arrangement proposes to undertake. ECOWAS will almost always
present the U.N. with a fait accomplis, since under its Protocol, it is only
obligated to report actions it has already taken.
Moreover, under its Protocol the actions ECOWAS is obligated
to report to the U.N. are more tightly defined than the ones under Article
54. The actions to be reported under the Protocol must be of military
nature, and must constitute an intervention. Thus, where ECOWAS
decides to use overwhelming non-military force, as economic sanction or
oil embargo-its two potent sanctions in Liberia and Sierra Leone-to
compel obedience with its own decisions, it has no duty to report that to
the U.N. 10 4 Additionally, where ECOWAS applies a disproportionate
military force within a peacekeeping operation, such that will normally
bring the action within enforcement action under the U.N. Charter, it is
not obligated to report to the U.N., for such actions are not 'military
interventions' as such. At most, such usage of preponderant military
force in the context of a peacekeeping operation might only impugn the
legality of the action under the law of peacekeeping and compromise the
integrity of the mandate.
Article 10(2)(c) of the Protocol empowers the Mediation and
Security Council (MSC) to "authorize all forms of intervention and
104 It is a common view among legal scholars that since states may, as a matter of course, impose
economic sanctions individually, they may, as part of their privileges as states, pull such sanctions
together and impose them collectively without recourse to the U.N. Security Council's authorisation
under Article 53(1). The crux of this contention is that economic sanctions do not constitute
enforcement action in the language of the U.N. Charter. Thus, the enforcement action referred to by
that Article must be assumed to be military action. This argument is faulty. There is a remarkable
difference between a single state imposing an economic sanction against another state and a
collection of states doing so. Where a collection of states impose sanction with the desire to hurt the
target state and forcefully induce or coerce it to comply with certain obligations, there is no logical
reason why that should not constitute enforcement action. Furthermore, in the light of the prohibition
of use of force by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, very few states find attraction in military force.
Indeed, superpowers like the United States may actually cause as much harm, even if not as drastic,
through economic sanctions rather than through military action, better still without legal
repercussions under the U.N. Charter. Since such states are encouraged by the Charter's non-
penalisation of economic sanctions, it is predicted that the consequences for the worst future
violations of Article 2(4) may consist of economic sanctions directed at undermining the political
integrity of these states.
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decide particularly on the deployment of political missions.105 The
Protocol further provides for a Commander'0 6 and a Special
Representative. 10 7 The whole structure of this Protocol is to make
ECOWAS exert total control over whatever troops it may deploy, and to
retain the command of its mission. This indeed is the underlying factor
for the adoption of the Protocol.
The next question that arises therefore is, despite a background
of distrust and crisis between UNAMSIL and ECOWAS in the first
phase of the intervention, and the adoption of the ECOWAS Protocol,
why did the U.N. not address the situation in the resolutions emerging
after 1270? How did this contribute to the problem experienced by the
UNAMSIL command in the second phase?
2. The Crisis of Command and Control in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL
vs. ECOMOG
At the close of the Abuja meeting, ECOWAS agreed to contribute troops
to UNAMSIL.' ° This was an endorsement of its first condition, having
jettisoned the idea of operating under the Lom6 Peace Accord, which had
been frequently breached by the rebels, or supplanting the U.N.
altogether, a proposal that was, in the real sense of the matter, not a very
realistic one. In effect, this means that ECOWAS agreed to become part
of UNAMSIL and subordinate its troops to the UNAMSIL command.
Yet, despite ECOWAS' adoption of the most credible and pragmatic of
its three proposals under the circumstances, the participation of its troops
in UNAMSIL was marked by mutual distrust between the two sides from
the very start.
While the issues that catalyzed the rift between the UNAMSIL
commander, Major-General Vijah Jetley and his ECOMOG counterpart,
Major-General Victor Malu, were traceable to certain reports allegedly
emanating from the former, it is believed that these issues only masked a
deep-seated hostility between the two parties, dating back to the first
phase of their mission. 0 9 A few months after the Nigerian contingent
returned to Sierra Leone and formally joined forces with UNAMSIL, the
ECOMOG commander, Major-General Malu, declared that "We
[Nigerians] are not going to serve under the man [Jetley] in whatever
105 See Ademola Abass, supra note 4, at 220.
106 Protocol, supra note 4, Article 33.
107 Protocol, supra note 4, Article 34(1).
108 http://www.ngrguardiannews.com.
109 See Jetley's Report on the Crisis in Sierra Leone (saying that "When General Kpamber went to
the U.N. HQ., New York, he was very disappointed to learn that he was not going to be the Force
Commander and that Nigeria would have three battalions out of this they had to concede one
battalion to the Guineans.') http://www.Siera-Leone.org/jetley.
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circumstances. And if he is not removed he will not get our cooperation,
and we are the largest contingent in the force." 1n In a more telling
episode, General Malu had later alleged that General Jetley's problem
with the Nigerian contingent arose from the latter's strident opposition to
what they perceived as Jetley's lack of consultation and the "dominance
of Indian Generals" at UNAMSIL headquarters. In addition, Malu
asserted that the Nigerian contingent stressed to the UNAMSIL
commander, at a meeting attended by the U.N. Secretary-General, that
"in a multinational force you do not exert the kind of control you apply
over your national army."' 1
Whatever might be the real cause of the rift in the leadership of
UNAMSIL may as well remain mysterious for our purpose. What is not
controverted, however, is that there has been series of problems in the
command of troops and the control of their mission. In an interview with
a BBC correspondent concerning the withdrawal of the Indian
UNAMSIL contingent, 12 the spokesman for the U.N. Secretary-General,
Fred Eckhard, admitted, "I can't exclude that the decision had something
to do with the leadership problems that we've had with this mission."' 
13
The U.N. Secretary-General himself, Kofi Annan, had noted in an
assessment report that there were "serious shortfalls in capability
encountered by UNAMSIL in the recent past with regard to the
command and control."' 14 In a more categorical reference to the looming
crisis, Mr. Fowler, the Canadian delegate to the Security Council's
4139th meeting, after advocating the creation of "a strong, united and
cohesive force" in Sierra Leone, noted that the proposed force "should
take the form of an expanded UNAMSIL and should respect the
fundamental military principle of unity of command, in this case the
command of Major-General Jetley.' 15
The reference to "unity of command" in that quoted statement
perhaps answers the question why Resolution 1270 did not specify the
110 Sierra Leone Web, News Archives, (Sept. 10, 2000), at http://www.sierra-leone.org/slnews
0900.html.
111 Id. (emphasis added).
112 On the Indians' withdrawal from UNAMSIL, see the transcript of the UNAMSIL Press
Briefing. Press Briefing, United Nations: Daily Press Briefing of Office of Spokesman for Secretary-
General, available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2000/20000922. db092200.doc.html
(last visited Sept. 22, 2000).
113 Press Briefing, United Nations: Daily Press Briefing of Office of Spokesman for Secretary-
General, available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2000/20000922.db092200.doc. html
(last visited Sept. 21, 2000).
114 Sierra Leone Web, News Archives, (Sept. 20, 2000), at http://www.sierraleone.org/slnews
0900.html.
115 S/PV.4139, supra note 53, at 8.
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command regime envisaged for an expanded UNAMSIL in Resolution
1289. Clearly, the Security Council had expected (or assumed) that
insofar as ECOMOG forces would form part of UNAMSIL, a 'unified'
command structure would become applicable. It seems plausible to
observe that leaving such an inference to be drawn by ECOMOG forces
seemed ill advised under the circumstances. With this unclear approach
in Resolution 1270, the Security Council would appear to have charted a
course of 'joint' action that, for all intent and purposes, was bound to
founder during implementation.
4. Factors that Militated Against UNAMSIL Command in Sierra
Leone
The difficulty experienced by UNAMSIL, in the area of
command and control of its mission, would appear to have stemmed
from two competing scenarios. On the one hand, the U.N. would appear
to be reluctant to discountenance the predilection of the largest provider
of ECOMOG, Nigeria, which would rather have things done in its own
way. 116 To antagonize the Nigerians would be to risk another exit of their
ECOMOG contingent (and most probably) the Guineans and the
Ghanaians contingents as well, from Sierra Leone.
On the other hand, the U.N. did not want to be seen as
succumbing to the pressure mounted by the Nigerians to substitute the
UNAMSIL commander Jetley with a Nigerian, an option that must be
expected to have attracted unpleasant consequences under the
circumstances. The current leader of UNAMSIL, Oluyemi Adeniji, is a
Nigerian, and so is the deputy force commander, Brigadier General
Mohammed who is, at the time of this writing, was acting in the stead of
the departed Indian commander, General Jetley. To have consented to a
substitution of Major General Jetley with yet another Nigerian would be
to completely subordinate the UNAMSIL force to ECOWAS command,
and, thus, subserve the collective will of the international community in
Sierra Leone to the dictates of a regional hegemon. In short, such a
decision would have made the UNAMSIL mission a regional action with
international imprimatur.
The conflict between ECOWAS and the U.N. in the area of
command and control succinctly exemplify the complications that
characterize joint peacekeeping operations by the U.N. and regional
organizations. It is to be expected that contributing countries, which are
in charge of the command of troops, would almost certainly want to be in
control of political decisions, especially those affecting their mandate.
This problem is likely to feature more strongly in missions dominated by
116 The Nigerians clearly wanted an enforcement action and were first prepared to infer such a
mandate from Resolution 1270. However, their inability to hold UNAMSIL to this sort of action led
in part to their frustration with the UNAMSIL command.
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states bearing the most of the human and material cost of a crisis.' 17 It is
in this context that General Malu's reference to the "dominance of Indian
Generals" is quiet revealing.
In fact, in the U.N. practice, precedents indicate that there is a
strong link between the command of troops and the control of political
decisions relating to their actions. Nowhere is this linkage better
manifested than perhaps in the 1991 Operation Desert Storm. 118 The
allied states, having the command of troops, so marginalized other
participating states, and the U.N. itself, in controlling the action, that the
U.N. Secretary-General of the day, Javier Perez de Cuellar, lamented that
all "we know about the war" is "what we hear from the three members of
the Security Council which are involved-Britain, France and the United
States-which every two or three days report to the Council, after the
actions have taken place. The Council, which has authorized all this, is
informed only after the military actions have taken place. 19
Concerning Sierra Leone, the problems of command and control
between the UNAMSIL and ECOWAS was worsened by many factors.
The prospect of this problem abating in future joint operations between
the U.N. and ECOWAS, or other regional organizations for that matter,
is indeed very dim. In many respects, Resolution 1270, which authorized
the UNAMSIL mission, was, in effect, a dead horse by the time it came
into force.'20 Although the Resolution came into existence before
ECOWAS adopted its new protocol, its implementation by UNAMSIL
should have, in the very least, addressed the changes that have occurred
within ECOWAS' collective security framework. This did not happen.
Hence vital issues, such as command and control and divergent mandate,
to state the obvious, were left hanging precariously.
It would have been thought that Resolution 1270 and those that
followed would take cognizance of the circumstances before their
adoption. This would include recognizing the particular position of
ECOWAS and its predilections: it was under its own command and
implementing its own mandate. Paying particular attention to these issues
would have, in the least, impressed it upon the Security Council the
117 It is generally acknowledged that Nigeria bore the substantial part of the human and materials
cost of ECOWAS mission in Liberia between 1989 and 1997 and Siena Leone between 1997 and
1999 when the U.N. decided to take over the peacekeeping mission itself See BBC NEWS, Nigeria
Sets Intervention Terms, May 10, 2000, available at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid
118 See John Quigley, supra note 47, at 1.
119 Leonard Doyle, Crisis in the Gulf: U.N 'Has No Role in Running War'INDEPENDENT (London),
Feb. 11, 1991, at 2 (interview with Prez de Cuellar).
120 See statements of the representatives of Malaysia and Bangladesh at the Security Council 4139th
meeting, supra notes 59, 60.
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urgent need to spell out details about command and control, especially
since UNAMSIL tasks were to be radically different from those
performed by UNOMSIL. In contrast, during the Liberian crisis,
Resolution 866 had noted that the deployment of UNOMIL in Liberia
"would be the first mission undertaken by the United Nations in co-
operation with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another
organizations." 121 Remarkably, the then Secretary-General of the U.N.
had issued a report which detailed the respective roles to be performed
by UNOMIL and ECOMOG.122 This despite the fact that UNOMIL was
only an observer mission with no real possibility of running into any
problems with ECOWAS which had been in Liberia three years before
the U.N. moved in. A similar step was particularly more desirable in
Sierra Leone where UNAMSIL had a peacekeeping mandate.
Furthermore, Resolution 1270 was all but clear in its few
specifications, especially as to the distribution of roles between
ECOWAS, which naturally assumed the right to take decisions regarding
Sierra Leone, 123 and the U.N., which arrived late on the scene and
consistently shunned the robust mandate favored by ECOWAS.
124
Unfortunately, the Security Council missed an opportunity to arrest the
problem when Resolution 1289, which revised Resolution 1270, failed to
address this perennial problem. Coming, as it did, in the aftermath of the
withdrawal of three ECOMOG contingents from Sierra Leone, and after
the declaration by Nigeria that it could not accept two peacekeeping
forces in the same country, the Security Council had reasons to anticipate
the future of a joint operation between UNAMSIL and ECOMOG. Thus,
it was more crucial at this point for the Security Council to use its
subsequent resolutions to put these matters straight. This was not to be.
In sharp contrast to the Sierra Leone scenario, Resolution 1244
concerning Kosovo was by far more succinct as to the relationship
between the Kosovo Forces (KFOR), which was to operate with the full
participation of the U.N. and NATO member states, and Operation
Allied Force, executed only by the latter. 125 In the Security Council
debate leading to the adoption of Resolution 1244, Russia and China
121 Resolution 866, supra note 3, at 1.
122 Report of the Secretary General on Liberia, U.N. Doc. S/26422, at 4 (1993).
123 For instance, in responding to General Jetley's report on Nigeria's leadership of UNAMSIL, the
Nigerian president charged: "When did he (Jetley) get there? How far has he gone? What has he
achieved?" Sierra Leone Web, News Archives, (Sept. 17, 2000), at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/slnews0900.html.
124 Mark Tran and Claudia McElroy, U.N. Failure in Sierra Leone Feeds Recriminations:
Foreigners Await Rescuers as Nigeria Sends Troops to Reverse Coup, GUARDIAN (London), May
29, 1997, at 15.
125 Resolution 1244, supra note 64.
2001-2002 SIERRA LEONE: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERVENTION 203
maintained that the KFOR should not be seen as an ex post ratification of
NATO's military action against FRY. 126 In recognition of a partnership
between the U.N. and NATO in the new arrangement, the resolution
provides for a joint command regime. 127 In practical terms, this implies
that the line of command and control pursued by NATO during its
intervention in Kosovo, and the regime of mandate therein, ceased upon
the entering into force of Resolution 1244. This, apart from the fact that
the major contributing states to KFOR, the United Kingdom, France and
US, are all permanent members of the Security Council, and so is Russia.
These states could expectedly resolve any crisis respecting command and
control within themselves.
An indication made by Russia and China during the Council's
4011 th meeting, or a categorical specification of the command regime in
Resolution 1270, was highly desirable in the Sierra Leone situation.
Although the Canadian representative referred to the need of all forces to
respect UNAMSIL's unified command, this was not adequate due to the
present circumstances. The need for a more vigorous demarcation of
command structure was all the more compelling in the light of the
perceived excessive use of force by ECOMOG troops against one of the
parties to the Sierra Leone conflict. Unarguably, ECOWAS had used
force markedly disproportionate to the type associated with peacekeeping
operations during the first phase of the intervention. It is through such a
use of force that it had reinstated the government of Tejan Kabbah in
1997. While the ends of that unauthorized use of force could be regarded
as a laudable achievement in itself, this cannot obviate the fact that the
means for accomplishing it was in total disregard of both the U.N.
Charter and customary principles of peacekeeping.
Thus, whether ECOWAS viewed the first phase of its
intervention in Sierra Leone as a peacekeeping operation per se, or an
enforcement action, a huge question mark hangs over the legality of its
use of force to restore Kabbah. Regional arrangements may not
undertake enforcement action without the authorization of the Security
Council. 128 When such arrangements are operating in a peacekeeping
version, the use of force is forbidden except in self-defense. At the
material time, ECOWAS' collective security activities were still
governed by its previous protocols and customary rules of peacekeeping.
Under both regimes, it observed its obligations under the Chapter VIII of
the U.N. Charter, and its action during those times would be measured in
accordance with those laws.
126 See the views of Russia and China in the debate leading to the adoption of Resolution 1244, in
the 401 lth of the Security Council, 10 June 1999.
127 Resolution 1244, supra note 64, at 6.
128 U.N. Charter art. 53, para. 1.
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In these circumstances, the sub-regional alliance could not be
regarded as having pursued a pure peacekeeping mandate during the first
phase of its intervention, for it had compromised its impartiality. If there
was any doubt about the real intention of ECOWAS as to how it wanted
to pursue the resolution of the Sierra Leone crisis in the second phase, it
cleared this when it openly endorsed an enforcement operation during the
Abuja meeting. This could only mean one thing then: that from the start
of the second phase of its intervention in Sierra Leone, the vision of
ECOWAS greatly differed from that of the U.N.
D. How may the U.N. Tackle the Problem of Command and
Control in Joint Operations?
It is to be expected that the problem of command of troops and
the political control of their action would be more pervasive in situations
where the largest providing states in a joint operation are not in
command of the U.N. mission in a region where they have major
influence. 129 One possible way of minimizing this problem would be for
the U.N. to be more precise in its resolutions, about its relationship with
a regional arrangement already mediating in a conflict prior to its
involvement.
To this end, adopting Resolution 1270 under Chapter VIII, as it
did under Resolution 1132, would have put ECOMOG squarely under
the U.N.'s direct authority. Legally speaking though, the absence of such
direct subordination of ECOWAS to the U.N. command regime by
means of a resolution should not really matter, since, in any case, Article
54 of the U.N. Charter obligates regional arrangements to report all
activities they undertake or contemplate.
However, by the time ECOWAS accepted to return to Sierra
Leone, a huge cloud already hung over its readiness and willingness to
abide by its obligation under Article 54, or any of the provisions of
Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter for that matter. Upon adopting a new
protocol, ECOWAS charted an independent regime of collective security
and arrogated to itself all the legal apparatuses of that institution.
Aside from a possible clarification of relationship by means of
its enabling resolutions, the U.N. could have reduced the potential areas
of collision between its mission and that of ECOWAS in yet another
way. Where a regional arrangement stipulates a mandate different from
that pursued by the U.N., as a condition for its participation in an
operation, it is suggested that the U.N. should not encourage or entertain,
as the case may be, the participation of such an organization. This is
especially necessary where troops from the member states of the
organizations are expected to form part of the U.N. mission. However,
129 Tim Butcher & George Jones, British Troops Face UN Threat To Shoot, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), May 16, 2000, at 1.
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such a decision should not preclude the participation of member states of
that organization as may be interested in joining the U.N. mission in their
own right.
Had the U.N. rejected ECOWAS' proposal to retain the
command of troops contributed to UNAMSIL by its member states as a
condition for further participation in Sierra Leone, two major problems
would have been averted. Firstly, there would not have been operational
incoherence, which constantly resulted from ECOWAS implementing a
robust mandate as against the U.N.'s peacekeeping one. Divergent
mandates would necessarily elicit different implementation methods and
this, inevitably, will adversely affect the coherence of the command of
troops. Secondly, had there been a unified mandate, the mission in Sierra
Leone would have been implemented solely in accordance with the
principles of the U.N. Charter and general international law governing
collective security. In the instant case, the decisions, mandate and
operations of ECOWAS, concerning the second phase of its intervention
in the Sierra Leone crisis, entirely originated from its Protocol.
Clear and precise mandates will undoubtedly help in securing a
more concerted effort early in the mission's life. Conversely, multiple
mandates will widen areas of tensions between the U.N. and other
regional arrangements, on the one hand, and between all states
participating in the operation, on the other. For instance, when the British
first deployed to Sierra Leone they consistently maintained that they
were in that country only to rescue their and other Commonwealth
nationals trapped therein. 3 ° Soon thereafter other reasons began to
emerge. 131 However, the British clearly indicated that they would always
remain under their own command.1
32
Although there might be, as it was in Sierra Leone, a dovetailing
of efforts at a later stage in the course of an operation with multiple
mandates, it is potentially dangerous for the U.N. to permit member
states to implement separate mandates alongside its own operation in the
same conflict. At the very least, this development could warrant negative
implications. It could discourage other states from joining the mission,
and for those already participating, it might hasten a decision to
withdraw. A clear example is the persistent complaint by the UNAMSIL
Jordanian contingent that unless NATO member states join UNAMSIL,
130 See the statement of Eldon, the U.K. delegate to the 4139th meeting of the Security Council,
supra note 53, at 7.
131 Id.
132 Kim Sengupta, Colin Brown, & Alex Duval Smith, Sierra Leone: Britain Set To Give Arms Aid,
INDEPENDENT (London), May 16, 2000, at 1, (reporting that "Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff
Hoon, assured the Commons yesterday that British Forces would not be drawn into the escalating
war").
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they too would withdraw. 133 Britain is a NATO member state, but by
implementing its own mandate and retaining the command of its troops
and control of its mission in Sierra Leone, it operated outside the
purview of the UNAMSIL. Certainly, the problem of states
implementing individual mandates alongside U.N.'s presence is capable
of further fragmenting whatever cohesion seems achievable in the
interaction of U.N.-regional arrangements under the auspices of
ambiguous resolutions like 1270.
To conclude this part, it is submitted that vague, unclear and
divergent mandates are a recipe for operational chaos in the joint
implementation of collective security measures. As Sierra Leone
demonstrates the effects of lack of coherence, non-clarification of
relationship between the U.N. and ECOWAS and divergent mandates are
not only felt in the area of command and control, they have deeper
impact on the overall well-being of the mission.
Having considered the difficulties experienced by the
UNAMSIL in the areas of command and control, the nature of
UNAMSIL mandate and its relationship with ECOMOG in the joint
implementation of UNAMSIL mandate, we now turn to the effect of
ECOWAS' new protocol on the customary rules of peacekeeping.
PART TWO
II. The Effects of ECOWAS' New Protocol on the 'Law' of
Peacekeeping
Under its new protocol, ECOWAS no longer requires the
consent of any of its member states in order to intervene in their
conflicts, whether intra or inter-state. Article 27 of the Protocol dispenses
with the rule requiring peacekeeping states to seek and obtain the consent
of a concerned state and other parties to a conflict before they could
intervene. This article states that "the Mechanism shall be applied
according to any of the following procedures. 1 34 The procedures
empower the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS to "inform Member
States of the Mediation and Security Council, and in consultation with
the Chairman, take all necessary and urgent measures.
1 35
Furthermore, Article 27(b) provides that the Mediation and
Security Council (MSC) "shall consider several options and decide on
the most appropriate course of action to take in terms of intervention."
' 136
Nothing in the entire provision of this Article makes reference to an
133 Sierra Leone Web, News Archives, (Sept. 21, 2000), at http://www.sierTa-leone.org/slnews
0900.html.
134 Protocol, supra note 4, at 245.
135 Id.
136Id.
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invitation by the Host State or any other conflicting party as a sine qua
non for ECOWAS intervention. Significant too is the first part of the
latter provision that the MSC shall consider several options. This could
very well be interpreted to mean that the MSC is not bound on a
particular course of action, for instance, such that the affected state may
particularly favor. Apart from that, it appears that the MSC is the main
originator of the process of intervention in contradistinction from
traditional peacekeeping where the government of the Host State is
expected to ask for or accept an offer of assistance from outsiders.
The legal ramification of this provision raises fundamental
questions about regional interventions and the law of peacekeeping.
Prima facie, this provision transforms ECOWAS into a super
organization which is not only competent to intervene in the affairs of
member states, but is entirely at liberty to decide on when to intervene,
how to intervene, and in which crises it will intervene.
In contrast to Article 27 of the ECOWAS Protocol, Article 16 of
the PMAD, under which ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone (phase
one) was conducted, codified the relatively stable customary rule on
invitation or consent by Host State. That provision states that "when an
external armed threat or aggression is directed against a Member State of
the Community, the Head of State of the country shall send a written
request for assistance to the current Chairman of the Authority of
ECOWAS, with copies to other Members. This request shall mean that
the Authority is duly notified and that the AAFC are placed under a state
of emergency. The Authority shall decide in accordance with the
emergency procedure as stipulated in Article 6. " 137
Although controversy has arisen about whether the invitation
sent by Samuel Doe at the outbreak of the Liberian crisis, or that sent by
Tej an Kabbah to ECOWAS from Guinea, met the formal requirement of
this article,138 it has been observed that the institutional structures of
regional arrangements are not meant to be exclusive. 139 Hence, mere non-
compliance with the strict formality of a procedure, without more, should
not be regarded as invalidating the process in itself, provided, de
137 PMAD, supra note 9.
138 C. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, 213 (Oxford Univ. Press) (2000)
(noting that "it is clear that the normal decision-making processes of ECOWAS were not followed");
Kofi Oteng Kufor, The Legality of the Intervention in the Liberian Civil War by the Economic
Community of West African States, 5 RADIC 525, 538 (1993) (arguing particularly that "[t]he
decision making process was subverted").
139 Georg Nolte, Restoring Peace by Regional Action, 23 ZAORV 53/3 602, 615 (1993) (Arguing
that "[e]xisting precedents show that the institutional aspects of collective security arrangements are
normally not meant to be exclusive").
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minimis, there is conformity with the fundamental element of the
requirement: that there must be an invitation.
For example, the Arab League operated the Arab Deterrent Force
in Lebanon between 1976 and 1983140 without complying with the
institutional structure provided for by the Treaty of Joint Defense and
Economic Cooperation. Also, the U.N. has always implemented the
provisions of Chapter VII of its Charter without complying with the
procedural mechanism of Article 43.41 It would be incredulous to argue
that such U.N. actions against North Korea and Iraq were invalid simply
because the actions were not implemented by the troops that were
contemplated by Article 43 of the U.N. Charter. Such defects, it is
submitted, are of form not of substance.
However, legally speaking, a distinction is to be made between a
mere non-compliance with the formality of a normative rule and the
absence of the constitutive elements of an action when considering its
validity in international law. In the second phase of the Sierra Leone
crisis, ECOWAS applied a provision that did not require the consent of
conflicting parties before its intervention. The question that arises thus is,
in the aftermath of the ECOWAS Protocol, wither the rule of
peacekeeping on host state consent?
A. Did ECOWAS' new Protocol Terminate the Right of Host State
to Invite Intervention Under International Law?
It is trite that there is no specific provision of the U.N. Charter
that regulates peacekeeping operations whether undertaken by the U.N.
or by regional arrangements. Whereas the legal rules governing
enforcement action are to be found in the U.N. Charter, especially
Chapter VII and Chapter VIII, the 'law' of peacekeeping has evolved
mainly through practice by the U.N., individual states and regional
arrangements.
Through practice, certain constant and pervasive features of
peacekeeping operations have come to be regarded as constituting the
'law' on peacekeeping. These include the principle that peacekeeping
operations cannot be used to affect the outcome of a conflict. This
principle is guaranteed by the requirement that peacekeepers must
140 For an analysis of the role played by Arab League in the Middle East, see I. 0. Pogany, The
Arab League and Regional Peacekeeping, 34 NILR 54, 54-74 (1987) (discussing the Arab Deterrent
Force in Lebanon).
141 The International Court of Justice, in the Certain Expenses Case, observed that such forces have
their legal basis in the U.N. Charter since they were designed "for the fulfilment of one of the stated
purpose of the United Nations." The Court held further that this function created "the presumption
that such action is not ultra vires the Organization." Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962
1.C.J. 151 at 167-168.
2001-2002 SIERRA LEONE: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERVENTION 209
remain, at all times, neutral. They may not intervene in a crisis, except
with the invitation of parties to the crisis,142 or use force except in self-
defense.143 They must remain permanently impartial throughout the
duration of an operation. 144 Although there have been instances when
some or all of these principles have been compromised by peacekeepers,
there is yet a strong consensus among writers and states that these
principles constitute the very foundation of peacekeeping operations.
Although it is true that consent of an affected state and other
parties to a conflict must be sought and obtained by peacekeeping states
before intervening in conflicts, there is no requirement that this consent
must be express or, at all times, prior, to intervention. 14' And while it is
reasonable to expect that consent will precede intervention, state practice
is generally uncertain in this regard, and as such, we cannot rule out
further developments. While a prior invitation is practically desirable and
reduces the risk of abuses and meddlesomeness, this has not been
possible in some circumstances, especially where there are several
parties to a conflict. Therefore, in certain circumstances, the existence of
consent may be inferred and could be obtained after the commencement
of intervention.
In Liberia, the Charles Taylor-led National Patriotic Movement
of Liberia (NPFL) did not give its consent expressly before ECOWAS
deployed its monitoring group (ECOMOG) to Liberia and, in fact,
violently opposed its presence at the early stages. Nevertheless, it
subsequently tolerated ECOWAS, participated in the Yamoussoukro
Accord IV and agreed to a cease-fire among all the parties. This suggests
that, even though the consent of a party to a conflict might not have been
142 Dag Hammarskjold, the U.N. Secretary-General under whose leadership the idea of
peacekeeping operations was hatched, once pointed out to the Advisory Committee of the U.N. that
"the very basis and starting point of this effort (UNEF) was the 'recognition of the General
Assembly of the unlimited sovereign rights of Egypt'." See FRYE, A. A UNITED NATIONS FORCE 15
(date unknown).
143 But see Dan Ciobanu, The Power Of The Security Council To Organize Peace-Keeping
Operations, United Nations Peace-Keeping: LEGAL ESSAYS 19, (A. Cassese, ed., Alphen Aan Den
Rijn: Sijhoff & Noordhooff 1978) (arguing that "the use of force is not entirely excluded from the
carrying out of the peace-keeping operations").
144 See LARRY L FABIAN, SOLDIERS WITHOUT ENEMIES: PREPARING THE UNITED NATIONS FOR
PEACEKEEPING, 16 (Brookings Institution 1971); D. WAINHOUSE, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING
AT THE CROSSROADS, 1 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1973); I. RIKHYE et al, THE THIN BLUE LINE:
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND ITS FUTURE, 10 (Yale Univ. Press 1974); I. RIKHYE , THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PEACEKEEPING, 57 (St. Martin's Press 1984) cited in Pogany, supra note
139, at 57, note 19.
145 See for instance Pogany, supra note 139, at 57, arguing that "in terms of international law, at
least some of these requirements may be unnecessarily restrictive."
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obtained before deployment, it is possible to gain this consent at a later
stage by necessary implication.
Conversely, an expressly or implicitly given consent may be
withdrawn by overt means or by the conduct of one or all the parties to
the disputes. Thus, when Charles Taylor eventually turned its fire on
ECOMOG troops, and later, on the UNOMIL, this clearly indicated a
withdrawal of the implicit consent given by the NPFL by necessary
implication. On the contrary, when confronted with the possible invasion
of his country by Israel, President Abdel Nasser of Egypt expressly
withdrew his consent to the deployment of U.N. troops in the Sinai
area.1
46
However, the scenario in Sierra Leone is much more complex,
and cannot be easily regarded as a case of implicit consent as the one in
Liberia. The truth of the matter is that ECOWAS did not require the
consent of the government of Sierra Leone, or that of any of the other
conflictual parties, when it decided to return to Sierra Leone. The explicit
decision, at the Abuja meeting, to undertake enforcement action overrode
any consideration of consent or invitation. This is because, when an
operation is declared to be an enforcement action, all the principles of
peacekeeping take their leave.
Insofar as Sierra Leone ratified the new protocol,
notwithstanding that it purportedly terminates member states' right to
formally invite ECOWAS to come into their conflict, this new obligation
takes precedence over any customary rule in that respect. Article 26 of
the treaty lists five parties who may initiate an intervention upon the
outbreak of a conflict. These are: the Authority of Heads of State and
Government of ECOWAS, the MSC, a member state, the Executive
Secretary of ECOWAS, and the Organization of African Unity or the
United Nations. 147 It is interesting to note that the only specification in
that article that provides that a member state may request an intervention
does not state that such a member state must be the one on whose
territory the conflict is occurring. Had that been the intention of
ECOWAS, it would have undoubtedly said so in the same vein it stated it
under Article 16 of PMAD. It is contended here that the use of the phrase
Ia member state' in the new protocol as against 'that country' in PMAD
is in line with the overall nature of the treaty. ECOWAS deliberately
frees its passage of intervention in a situation where the Member State,
being a subject of a conflict refuses to invite an intervention. It means
any other member State is not precluded from requesting an intervention.
Thus, it is not implausible to conclude that ECOWAS member
states have conceded to ECOWAS the sole authority to decide for them
146 W. DURCH, THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING: CASE STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS, 124 (St. Martin's Press 1993).
147 Protocol, supra note 4, at 245.
210
2001-2002 SIERRA LEONE: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERVENTION 211
when to intervene in their intra and inter state conflicts and the means by
which it will intervene.
It is submitted further that it is not an aberration in international
law for states to bind themselves to this kind of obligation,
notwithstanding the apparent effect such might have on their sovereignty.
Legal writers of note have expressed the opinion that "the right of
intervention may arise as a result of a treaty by which one state,
expressly or by implication, consents to intervention for certain purposes
by another state. 148 Sierra Leone did, not only agree under the new
Protocol that ECOWAS could come into its territory in the manner
already discussed, it also agreed to pre-determined occasions that might
lead to such interventions. These are the circumstances enumerated in
Article 25 of the Protocol as constituting the casu foederis for ECOWAS
action. 14 Thus, by agreeing in advance that ECOWAS may intervene in
certain times in specific crises affecting member states, these states
waive their 'customary' right to specifically invite ECOWAS
intervention in terms of crises.
It is contended that no rule of international law governing
peacekeeping operations forbids the coming together of member states of
an international organization for the purpose of giving to the organization
in advance, and collectively, a privilege or right they are legally able to
give to it individually and when the need arises.
It seems entirely credible that the provision of Article 27, which
relates to the procedural application of the Protocol, culminated from
ECOWAS' previous practice in Liberia and its experience in the first
phase of the Sierra Leone crisis. Thus, it is a perfect instance in which
treaty provisions developed from customary international law. The
constant practice by ECOWAS intervening in the affairs of member
states, with or without clear invitation, would appear to have matured
into a situation in which its position as having the de facto authority to
intervene in West African crises is now a fait accompli. The evolution of
customs into treaty law is an affirmation of Anthony D'Amato's
observation that "if treaties generate customary rules when they come
into force, treaties do not "freeze" such customary rules forever. Rather
148 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 446 (9th ed. 1992).
149 This article provides that the Protocol shall apply "(a) in cases of aggression or conflict in any
Member State or threat thereof; (b) In case of conflict between two or several Member States; (c) In
case of internal conflict: (i) that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster, or (ii) that poses a
serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region; (d) In the event of an overthrow or attempted
overthrow of a democratically elected government; (f) Any other situation as may be decided by the
Mediation and Security Council. Protocol, supra note 4, at 244.
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new customary rules may arise out of the practice of states, and these
new rules may alter the previous treaty-generated rules." 50
B. Did Sierra Leone and Other ECOWAS States Forever Bind
Themselves to ECOWAS Sole Discretion on Intervention in their
Affairs?
The next issue that arises for determination is whether, under the
new regime, ECOWAS member states perpetually bind themselves by
consenting in advance to ECOWAS' intervention in their conflicts.
Article 27 of the Protocol seems to warrant an affirmative answer to this
question. Indeed, since there is no requirement of any form of invitation
in the article, it would appear that the act of consenting in advance by
ECOWAS' member states has curtailed their right to decline an
intervention by ECOWAS in their conflicts.
The rationale for the non-inclusion of the requirement of
invitation or consent in the Protocol indicates that Member States may
not terminate ECOWAS missions in their conflicts at will, or prevent its
intervention upon the outbreak of violence. Often, it is difficult to obtain
consents from all parties to a conflict. Somalia is a classical example of
this. General Farah Aideed refused to give his consent and opposed the
intervention by the U.N. from the outset. Furthermore, despite the claim
by ECOWAS that it was invited by Samuel Doe into Liberia, the fact that
ECOWAS did not obtain the consent of the de facto ruler of Liberia at
the relevant time, Charles Taylor, cast a long shadow over the legality of
that action. In addition, even where consent of all parties is obtained
before deployment of troops, sustaining the consent to the very end of
the conflict is quite problematic. In the Suez Canal crisis, UNEF pulled
out because Egypt withdrew its consent.
ECOWAS was clearly unwilling to subject its ability to police its
hemisphere to the whims and caprices of conflictual parties who cannot
always be expected to be enthusiastic of ECOWAS' intervention bid.
Experience in Liberia, where Charles Taylor's NPFL and Sierra Leone
where the RUF consistently opposed ECOWAS actions means that rebel
factions will always use their consent as a trump card whenever
ECOWAS chooses a path different from their dictates. Apart from that,
obtaining consent in advance will go a long way in helping ECOWAS to
deal not only with conflictual parties, but also certain of its member
states acting against their collective decision. In the Liberia crisis for
instance, C6te d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso were alleged to be acting
against the collective interest of the organization by siding with the
rebels.151 During the Liberia crisis these countries did not consent to
150 A. D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AJIL 516, 523
(1993).
151 Communiqu6, supra note 33.
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ECOWAS action although they did not explicitly oppose it. With
advance consent in place, it is legally difficult for states to prevent
ECOWAS intervention by withholding their consents, except, of course,
if such is implemented at the level of the Authority decision.
Nevertheless, it is yet difficult to argue that when ECOWAS
member states ratified the new protocol in November 1999 they, for all
intents and purposes, intended to bind themselves forevermore to
ECOWAS' sole authority to intervene in members' conflicts. Article 91
of the Revised treaty of ECOWAS states that "Any Member State
wishing to withdraw from the Community shall give to the Executive
Secretary one year's notice in writing who shall inform Member States
thereof. At the expiration of this period, if such notice is not withdrawn,
such a State shall cease to be a member of the Community." In
accordance with this provision, a member State not willing to accept
ECOWAS intervention in a conflict occurring within its territory, or
between it and another state, is legally able to withdraw from the
Organization. Upon such withdrawal, ECOWAS cannot legally intervene
in such conflict even if it threatens the peace and security of the region.
The provision of Article 91 however raises one practical
problem. The duration between the serving of a notice and the notice
maturing into an effective withdrawal is one year. A notice served is thus
not effective until after the expiration of this period. Could ECOWAS
then continue its plan to intervene, or its intervention, in a conflict
affecting a member state which has served a withdrawal notice under that
article, but which notice has not matured into an effective withdrawal?
The question is answered by the second paragraph of Article 91. This
states that "[d]uring the period of one year referred to in the preceding
paragraph, such a Member State shall continue to comply with the
provisions of this Treaty and shall remain bound to discharge its
obligation under this Treaty."
This provision is extremely significant concerning the inquiry
whether ECOWAS states perpetually bind themselves to the obligation
to entertain intervention by the organization in their conflicts. Article
91(2) binds member states to their obligations under the ECOWAS
constituent treaty of 1975 as revised. The Protocol was adopted in
conformity with the provisions of Article 58 of the constituent treaty of
ECOWAS, which imposes an obligation of the nature in question on
member states.152 Thus, the obligation incurred under the constituent
treaty extends to the obligation assumed under the subsequent treaties. In
152 Article 58 of the Revised Treaty states that "member States undertake to work to safeguard and
consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within their
region. In pursuit of these objectives, member States undertake to co-operate with the Community in
establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of
intra-State and inter-State conflicts." Revised Treaty, supra note 1.
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addition, the terms of Article 91(2) are mandatory and not open to the
discretion of member states. It states that such a member state shall
continue to comply with the provisions and shall remain bound to
discharge its obligation under the treaty. Although it may prove
practically difficult for ECOWAS to be able to enforce the terms of this
provision against a state that has served a notice of withdrawal on the
organization, this does not affect the import of that provision. During the
pendency of the notice to withdraw, a state is theoretically bound to
accept ECOWAS intervention.
The Rules of Procedure of the Mediation and Security Council153
may, in practice, become the only procedural solution to the problem of
member states which are unwilling to remain bound to their obligation
under the Protocol. By virtue of Article 34 of the Rules, "a member of
the Security Council may move that the consideration of [a] matters be
postponed." This provision however only avails a state which is a
member of the MSC. Where a reluctant state is not a member of the
MSC, it may act to stop the consideration of a proposal to intervene in its
conflict under Article 30 of the Rules. Under this article,
Where an objection is recorded on behalf of a member State to a
proposal submitted for the decision of the Security Council, the proposal
shall, unless such objection is withdrawn, be referred by the
Ambassadors to the Ministerial meeting and to the meeting of Heads of
State and Government if emanating from a meeting of Ministers.
Thus, it is submitted that notwithstanding the stringent terms of
Article 91(2), a member state which is unwilling to accept an
intervention by ECOWAS in its conflict may prevent such intervention
by raising a preliminary objection before the proposal is considered by
the MSC. Should the latter fail to resolve the matter, a final recourse is to
be had to the Authority of Heads of States and Government on which the
head of state of the concerned state sits whether or not his or her state is a
member of the MSC.
In Sierra Leone, for example, the government was able to
regulate the activities of ECOWAS and UNOMSIL through letters issued
by its president to the Security Council demarcating the responsibilities
of the two organizations on its soil. Had Sierra Leone had any reason to
reject ECOWAS intervention, it would either have expressly said so
during the ECOWAS summit that preceded its return to Sierra Leone, or
would have served a withdrawal notice under Article 91 of the new
protocol which had entered into effect at the relevant time. While it is
admitted that the procedures by which a reluctant state may wriggle out
off what looks like a perpetual obligation under the new protocol, it is
submitted that the matter would be resolved procedurally.
153 On file with author.
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CONCLUSION
The joint implementation of Resolution 1270 by UNAMSIL and
ECOMOG forces highlights the many problems that attend to this kind
of action. One lesson the Sierra Leone experiment does teach is that the
last is yet to be seen as to the development of new trends by regional
arrangements. It seems appropriate thus to observe that it is too early in
the day to arrive at definitive conclusions about the nature of relationship
between the U.N. and regional organizations. It should not always be
assumed, as most analysts of regional collective security tend to do, that
once the U.N. peacekeepers are afield and are joined by the forces of a
regional organization, then the collective security equation is
automatically tantamount to a peacekeeping action. It is urged that each
action, each operation that involves two or more organizations should be
assessed in accordance with the particular facts and dynamics of the case.
A generic assumption about joint operations may obliterate evolving
trends as Sierra Leone clearly demonstrates.
The U.N. Charter codifies, amongst other things, the laws of
armed conflict and use of force. States implement those laws. It is this
implementation of these laws that is referred to as collective security.
Whilst states incur certain obligations under the Charter, the Charter has
not carved how states may apply its laws in stone. The Charter is an
evolutionary document with ample life in its lungs still. States, through
their practice, must make meaning out of Charter provisions. Whilst a
single act by a regional arrangement may not constitute an acceptable
departure from the Charter norm, a recurrent pattern of events, even by a
single regional arrangement may be signaling a new trend in how states
perceive a particular provision of the U.N. Charter.
The Charter prescribes, but states apply. In this application,
states have their own assessment of the Charter laws, as to their
adequacy or otherwise to specific scenarios. When states perceive the
need, they adopt other treaties which may complement the Charter or
depart from it. ECOWAS did. Whether one perceives the ECOWAS
Protocol as complementing or departing from the Charter is up to
individual assessment. But what is undoubted is that the provisions of
that treaty signal a new development in the law and practice of regional
collective security.
The U.N. must adjust to new trends in the regional collective
security system. Obstinate adherence to classical notions could only lead
to further complexities. Peacekeeping developed because the centralized
collective security machinery of the Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
could not be realized. Since the end of the Cold War, the world has
witnessed a momentous involvement of regional arrangements in
collective security. Can the U.N., then, afford to stay faithful to classical
notions of peacekeeping, which evolved in response to the circumstances
of the 1950s?
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In Sierra Leone, the U.N. stuck to a peacekeeping mandate in a
situation where there was no peace to keep. Yet, it accepted to work in
conjunction with an organization which is committed to enforcement
action. Divergent mandates are a recipe for disaster. The relationship
between UNAMSIL and ECOMOG attests to that much. Unclear regime
of command and control in joint missions is all that is required for the
forces to pull in different directions. If there was any lesson the U.N.
must learn from this so-called joint-peacekeeping, it is that in reality the
action was neither joint nor a substantial part of it peacekeeping.
The law of peacekeeping develops through the practice of its
practitioners. Regional arrangements are one of the most legitimate
practitioners of peacekeeping. ECOWAS pioneered joint-peacekeeping
operations. It is undoubtedly one of the most active regional
arrangements since the end of the Cold War. As such, its recent trends-
a wider conception of peace and security, broader framework of
collective security, and a new approach to the rules of peacekeeping-
will most likely influence how operations by regional arrangements must
be viewed and evaluated in international law henceforth. It is our view
that the future of the relationship between the U.N. and regional
organization does not lie in the perception that the Charter obligations
are immutable, but that a harmonious modus operandi can be worked out
between the two organizations, even if they must occasionally or at all
times operate under different legal regimes.
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